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Abstract 
Trade policy has been an important part of the global response to Covid-19. In order to 
boost production and increase the supply of critical goods, countries have lowered tariff 
barriers, put export restrictions in place, and smoothed the path to issue compulsory 
licenses for patented medicines and medical devices. All of these measures touch on trade 
policy, and fall under the ambit of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This raises the 
question: do the flexibilities built into WTO law give countries the policy space they need 
to take emergency measures during this health crisis? This short paper explains the WTO 
rules and their application to national trade measures in response to Covid-19 using the 
example of export restrictions. It finds that from a legal perspective, WTO rules are flexible 
enough to permit countries to deviate from their normal obligations during this time of crisis. 
However, from a justice perspective, these flexibilities will be far more useful for wealthy 
developed states than for those with less purchasing power and production capacity. 
Indeed, the flexibility built into WTO law may prove ineffectual and even detrimental for 
poorer states, as it permits the wealthy the policy space to take measures in their own 
interest while leaving the less powerful without access to critical goods. The paper 
concludes that here, as elsewhere, the negative economic effects of Covid-19 will fall 
disproportionately on the poor and the vulnerable. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In response to the Covid-19 crisis, countries across the globe have implemented policies 
to spur production of critical goods, support the development of vaccines and anti-viral 
treatments, and safeguard domestic supplies of medicines, protective equipment, and 
diagnostic devices. Trade policy has played an important part in this global response, as 
countries lower entry barriers for medical products, put up export restrictions to keep 
scarce supplies at home, and look for ways to increase the production of medicines and 
medical devices and ensure affordable access for their populations.  
 
These measures fall within the scope of World Trade Organisation (WTO) law, under which 
countries have agreed to certain limits on their freedom to implement trade-related policies. 
These limits generally require countries to remove unnecessary barriers to trade, not to 
discriminate against products and services from other WTO members, to fairly administer 
their technical rules, to do away with certain types of subsidies, and to ensure a minimum 
level of protection for intellectual property, among other things.  
 
Some of the trade measures that countries have taken to combat Covid-19 are 
permissible even desirable under WTO rules. For example, many countries have 
lowered barriers to trade in critical goods, seeking to increase supplies and protect supply 
chains by making it cheaper and easier for products to cross international borders. To this 
end, governments have suspended or even eliminated tariffs on medicines and other 
critical supplies, suspended the application of anti-dumping duties on medical goods, and 
approval of products necessary for the fight against Covid-19.1 WTO members are 
certainly permitted to decrease trade barriers by lowering tariffs and simplifying entry 
procedures, so long as they do so in a non-discriminatory fashion, and observers have 
widely applauded these moves. Indeed, some have argued that they should be made a 
permanent part of WTO law after the crisis ends, as cheaper access to medical goods will 
be of long-term benefit to all.2 
 
Other responses, however, are less clearly compliant with WTO rules. Measures like 
export restrictions and limitations on patent protections are WTO-compatible only if they 
fall under the exceptions and flexibilities available under the current regime. This raises 
the important question of whether the flexibilities built into WTO law give countries the 
policy space they need to take emergency measures during this health crisis, and whether 
in doing so WTO law promotes positive global outcomes. 
 
This short paper addresses this question in two ways. First, it asks from a legal perspective 
whether or not WTO law permits the measures that countries have imposed thus far, and 
are considering imposing in the future. By way of illustration, it examines the rules that 
govern export restrictions on goods, explaining the requirements under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)3 and the carve-outs and exceptions that countries 
can make use of in order to justify actions that would normally fall afoul of the WTO 
rulebook. It concludes that the WTO Agreements do contain flexibilities for at least some 
types of emergency measures, and permit governments to act in ways that would normally 
contravene their obligations in order to respond to a public health crisis. 
 
Second, it asks from a justice perspective whether the legal flexibilities contained in the 
WTO rulebook are sufficient to protect the interests of all countries in ensuring access to 
while facially neutral, will be far more useful for wealthy developed states than for the 
developing world. Indeed, the flexibility built into WTO rules may prove ineffectual and 
even detrimental for poorer states, as it gives the wealthy the policy space to take 
measures in their own interest while leaving the less powerful without access to critical 
goods. As a result, WTO flexibilities may magnify, rather than diminish, the underlying 
divisions between countries in terms of purchasing power and production capacity.  
 
II. Are Export Restrictions on Goods Permissible under WTO Law? 
 
Among other measures put into place in the context of the Covid-19 crisis, a growing 
number of countries have enacted various types of export restrictions on goods, including 
medicines, medical devices, protective supplies, and food.4 These measures have come 
1 For example, Argentina has suspended anti-dumping duties on the import of syringes from China; Costa 
Rica granted a moratorium on import tariffs from April  June 2020; and the European Union implemented 
-19: Trade 
and Trade-
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/trade_related_goods_measure_e.htm> accessed 10 
June 2020. 
2 See, e.g., Jennifer A Hillma -
Think Global Health, 20 March 2020, available at <https://www.thinkglobalhealth.org/article/six-proactive-
steps-smart-trade-approach-fighting-covid-19> accessed 10 June 2020. 
3 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, LT/UR/A-1A/1, 14 April 1994(GATT) <http://docs.wto.org>. 
4 -
1). 
in the form of outright bans or restrictions on export as well as the introduction of new or 
strengthened export licensing and approval procedures. Such restrictions seek to 
safeguard national supplies of critical products, ensure food security, and prevent domestic 
 
 
The GATT generally prohibits quantitative restrictions (that is, measures such as bans and 
quotas) on exports of goods.5 The ban on quantitative restrictions is quite broad, covering 
both de jure and de facto measures imposed by WTO members. Any prohibition or 
limitation of exports in order to combat Covid-19 would clearly be caught by this rule, and 
is thus in principle incompatible with the GATT. 
 
The prohibition of quantitative restrictions is, however, subject to four important sets of 
exceptions that significantly soften the impact of this ban. 
 
First, the GATT includes a carve-
applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to 
6 In the context of Covid-19 this means that a country can 
impose temporary export restrictions or prohibitions in order to prevent critical shortages 
long as necessary,7 
crucial, that amount to a situation of decisive importance, or that reach a vitally important 
8 Thus, countries must be careful to restrict exports 
only of essential products, and only for a limited period (though this period may extend as 
long as necessary). Such restrictions should also be non-discriminatory, applying to all 
third countries equally and maintain insofar as possible a proportional distribution of trade.9 
of the GATT, and may thus be freely imposed. This carve-out is one of the two flexibilities 
cited most by the countries that have adopted export restrictions thus far, along with the 
general exception for health measures discussed below.10 
 
When it comes to restrictions on the export of agricultural products a few additional rules 
apply. Export restrictions on food are permitted where necessary to protect food security. 
Such restrictions were used extensively during the 2007 2008 global food crisis, for 
example. The W
place restrictions on food exports, it should take into account the potential effects of the 
Agriculture about the nature and extent of the rules, and, if requested, consult with other 
countries and provide them with information regarding the export restrictions.11 There is 
5 GATT, art XI(1). The Agreement on Agriculture provides further specific rules on export restrictions in the 
context of agricultural products (Agreement on Agriculture, LT/UR/A-1A/2, 15 April 1994, (AoA) art 12 
<http://docs.wto.org
 
6 GATT, art XI(2)(a). 
7 China Measures Related to the Exportation of Certain Raw Materials, WT/DS394/AB/R, 30 January 
2012, [323] [331]. 
8 Ibid [324]. 
9 GATT, art XIII. 
10 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/export_prohibitions_report_e.pdf> accessed 10 June 
2020. 
11 AoA, art 12. 
some debate, however, as to whether this provision in fact imposes any hard substantive 
agricultural export restrictions.12  
 
rt tariffs or duties are generally permitted by 
WTO law so long as they continue to respect non-discrimination rules and continue to treat 
other countries equally.13 This means that countries could impose taxes on the export of 
medicines, devices, protective equipment, or other critical supplies in order to generate 
revenue or discourage exports.14  
 
Some countries have made special additional commitments to minimise, transform, or 
eliminate export taxes as part of their terms of accession to the WTO, and a few of these 
may be relevant in the context of measures taken to combat Covid-19.15 Montenegro, for 
16 which would 
include any new charge imposed on critical goods. Domestic policy space may in such 
cases face additional constraints.  
 
flexibilities, they may still fall under the general exceptions to WTO law. Three of these 
exceptions are potentially relevant here.  
 
First, countries may put in place measures otherwise incompatible with their GATT 
so in a way that does not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate among countries, and does 
not amount to a disguised restriction on trade.17 
addressing the Covid-19 situation, which may bar rules that are deemed to be more 
restrictive than is reasonable. Siddharth Aatreya has argued that this would exclude, for 
example, measures that hoard essential goods beyond the level that a country could 
reasonably need.18 
ead strictly.19 This general exception for health measures is the 
second flexibility commonly cited by the countries that have adopted export restrictions 
thus far, alongside the carve-out explained above.20 
12 For the argument that the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture should be read more strictly, see 
l Trade Law: A Way 
16. 
13 See further China Raw Materials (n 7) [321]. 
14 But see Howse and Josling (n 12) 17 18 (arguing that the exemption of export taxes should be read in 
light of the object and purpose of GATT Article XI, and thus restricted to measures with a primarily fiscal, 
rather than trade-restrictive, objective). 
15 These countries include Bulgaria, Mongolia, Latvia, Estonia, Georgia, Croatia, China, Saudi Arabia, Viet 
Nam, 
Afghanistan (Marceau (n 5) 576 581). 
16 
WT/ACC/CGR/38, 5 December 2011 [132]. 
17 GATT, art XX(b). 
18 -19 Related Trade Restrictions WTO- EJIL:Talk!, 25 April 
2020, <https://www.ejiltalk.org/are-covid-19-related-trade-restrictions-wto-consistent/> accessed 10 June 
2020. 
19 WTO Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
WT/DS135/AB/R, 12 March 2001 [172]. 
20  
 
Second, countries may make use of the general e
domestic materials necessary to ensure essential quantities of such materials to a 
materials is held below the world price. 21 Here, too, such measures would need to be put 
in place in a way that does not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate among countries, and 
does not amount to a disguised restriction on trade. This exception could cover, for 
example, situations in which a country placed price caps on materials necessary for the 
production of critical supplies, and coupled these price controls with export restrictions in 
order to keep the supplies from being sold on world markets at higher prices.  
 
Third, countries may 
they do so in a way that does not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate among countries, 
and does not amount to a disguised restriction on trade.22 Such measures must be 
ary 
to achieve this goal.23 
 a simple lack of domestic 
production capacity will not be sufficient.24 This exception includes the further caveats that 
context of Covid-19 export restrictions, this would seem to permit, for example, restrictions 
on trade in protective equipment, so long as that equipment is in short supply, the 
restrictions do not direct all exports to one country (violating the principle of equity), and 
are limited to the duration of the shortage. 
 
Finally, countries could also attempt to justify their export restrictions on the basis of 
national security concerns. The GATT contains a broad national security exception that 
25 The national security exception has so far been referenced 
primarily to justify boycotts and restrictions on trade and transit during times of conflict, and 
this seems to have been the understanding of the original drafters of the GATT.26 However, 
clear,27 and it is possible that Covid-19, which has been declared a global pandemic by 
21 GATT, art XX(i). 
22 GATT, art XX(j). 
23 The AB in India Solar Cells found that the same weighing and balancing process would apply to 
ures are 
India  WT/DS/456/AB/R, 16 
September 2016 [5.63]).  
24 Ibid [5.75] [5.77]. 
25 GATT, art XXI(b)(iii). 
26 
 
27 A WTO Panel in 2019 provided a first interpretation of this provision in Russia Traffic in Transit, in 
which it found that a series of Russian measures preventing the movement of goods from Ukraine during 
the 2014 conflict could be justified under the national security exception (Russia Measures Concerning 
Traffic in Transit, WT/DS512/R, 5 April 2019. 
the World Health Organization, could pass the test, permitting countries to take whatever 
 
 
Provided that they apply their measures in a non-discriminatory way and respect the other 
limited requirements imposed by the various carve-outs and exceptions discussed in this 
section, it is likely that many national export restrictions on critical goods will be permissible 
under WTO rules.28 As was seen during the 2007 2008 food crisis, GATT flexibilities do 
seem broadly sufficient to permit countries to put in place extraordinary export measures 
in order to deal with a national crisis. However, the question of whether and to what extent 
this flexibility will actually serve to ensure that WTO Members are able to access the 
medicines, devices, protective equipment, food, and other supplies they need to combat 
the global pandemic is another matter. Indeed  these very flexibilities may prove 
detrimental to countries that need to import goods from abroad and the lack domestic 
production capacity or financial resources to make up for the loss of global supply. 
 
III. Are the WTO Flexibilities Sufficient to Ensure Medical and Food Security?  
 
While it is understandable that countries concerned with supply would wish to put export 
restrictions in place, such restrictions also pose significant dangers, particularly to smaller 
economies and those lacking in domestic production capacity.  
 
To begin with, export restrictions disrupt supply chains, causing delays in production and 
transport and impeding access to essential goods. Pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and 
other high-priority items are frequently the products of multiple jurisdictions, with 
manufacturers, intellectual property holders, and shipping lines stretching across national 
borders. In such cases, self-sufficiency is simply not a viable option. The interruption of 
global supply chains negatively impacts production, approval, and distribution processes, 
reducing supply and increasing prices for all.  
 
Second, export restrictions can be self- 29 as 
countries put their own limitations in place in response to previously imposed rules. 
Research has found that during the global food crisis of 2008, export restrictions led to a 
13% increase in world food prices in general, and a 45% increase for rice, one of the 
hardest-hit products.30 In the case of medical devices, almost all economies are importers 
as well as exporters, making everyone vulnerable to price increases, but affecting those 
with less purchasing power the most. Countries with greater financial resources will be 
better placed to withstand price surges, while states with weaker fiscal positions and higher 
public debt will see the real value of their budgets fall, and will be far less able to borrow 
to support government policies.31 
 
Retaliation is also a matter of concern. For example, when US President Donald Trump 
decided to impose export restrictions on N95 protective masks, Canadian Prime Minister 
28 
Quantitative Restrictions, G/L/59/Rev.1, 22 June 2012 <https://docs.wto.org> accessed 10 June 2020). 
29  of Trade 
al Economics 102. 
30 Ibid. 
31 See, eg, Cesar Calderon et al, Africa's Pulse, No 21, Spring 2020: An Analysis of Issues Shaping 
, World Bank, 2020. 
recei 32 Retaliation is a concern with 
Covid-related food export restrictions as well, to the degree that the Directors-General of 
the Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Health Organization joined the WTO 
Director-
availability can spark a wave of export restrictions, creating a shortage on the global 
33 
 
Finally, export restrictions have a differential impact on countries with smaller or non-
existent domestic production capacity for critical goods.34 For example, World Bank 
economists Aaditya Mattoo and Michele Ruta have found that only seven countries 
account for 70% of world exports of ventilators.35 Export restrictions put in place by any of 
these states would endanger access to medical supplies throughout the world, and the 
hardest hit states would, again, be those without the resources to buy or build their own. 
In some areas, this has already come to pass. Despite calls for solidarity,36 the EU put in 
place restrictions on face shields, mouth-nose protection equipment, protective spectacles 
and visors, protective garments, and gloves beginning in March, and continued to restrict 
the export of masks, spectacles, and protective garments through the end of May.37 Chad 
Bown of the Peterson Institute for International Economics warned of the severe 
consequences of this move for countries that have historically imported these products 
from the EU, such as Cape Verde (89% of protective spectacles and visors), Niger (71%), 
and Angola (62%).38 
 
States and international organisations have recognised the damage that may be caused 
by export restrictions, and in response have proposed some guiding principles that 
countries should follow when enacting emergency trade measures. The G20, for example, 
39 And the WTO and 
World Customs Organisation (WCO) have stressed the importance of export measures 
32 nded for 
Independent, 3 April 2020.  
33 - WTO, 31 
March 2020) < https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/igo_26mar20_e.htm> accessed 27 April 
2020. 
34 -19 Crisis in 
VoxEU, 9 April 2020 <https://voxeu.org/article/trade-and-covid-19-crisis-developing-
countries> accessed 15 April 2020. 
35 World Bank Blogs, 27 
March 2020, <https://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/viral-protectionism-time-coronavirus> accessed 27 April 
2020. 
36 -
COVID- https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-
remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---3-march-2020> accessed 14 April 2020. 
37 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/568 of 23 April 2020 making the exportation of certain 
products subject to the production of an export authorisation [2020] OJ L 129/7. 
38 -19: Demand Spikes, Export Restrictions, and Quality Concerns Imperil Poor 
COVID-19 and Trade 
Po  (Vox / CEPR Press 2020), 35. 
39 
<https://g20.org/en/media/Documents/G20SS_Statement_G20%20Second%20Trade%20&%20Investment
%20Ministerial%20Meeting_EN.pdf> accessed 10 June 2020. 
being temporary and designed in a non-discriminatory way.40 These guidelines do not 
impose any hard limits on national behaviour, but seek to prompt countries to think more 
carefully about the design of their export restrictions while preserving their freedom to act 
as they believe necessary.  
 
Fearing that these moves do not go far enough to prevent or remedy the negative impacts 
of export restrictions, some scholars have called on the international community to take 
bolder and more legally binding action. Wendy Cutler, for example, has argued that the G7 
and G20 should call for a standstill on tariff hikes, export bans, and export limitations, and 
that the WTO should call an emergency session to act on the surge in export restrictions.41 
Mona Pinchis- -
drop their trade barriers, rather than being 
permitted to raise them, during times of global emergency.42 The likelihood of any legal 
development of this type is, however, vanishingly small -
existing struggles over the collapse of the Doha round trade negotiations, the turn to 
bilateralism and regionalism as the primary forums for economic liberalisation, and the 
appoint new members to the Appellate Body.43  
 
Covid-19-related export restrictions even those that are WTO-compliant are likely to 
increase prices, decrease supply, and disrupt supply chains, especially when put in place 
by important industrial centres. And in the absence of more extensive international 
cooperation and commitment to ensure that the interests of developing countries are 
protected, it can only be the case that the poorest and most vulnerable will 
disproportionately suffer the negative impacts of any trade measures enacted in response 
to the crisis. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Times of crisis prompt us to reconsider law and policy by exposing stress points and 
weaknesses in the existing system. In the world of WTO law, the Covid-19 crisis, like the 
food crisis of 2007 2008, has brought attention to, among other issues, the tricky question 
of export restrictions.  
 
As explained in Section II, the GATT provides numerous flexibilities that allow countries to 
enact emergency measures that would otherwise be incompatible with their WTO 
obligations. So long as export restrictions are non-discriminatory, temporary, and do not 
go beyond what is needed to protect domestic supply, they are likely permissible under 
40 -WTO Joint Statement on COVID-
<https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/igo_06apr20_e.htm>. 
41 Asia Society Policy 
Institute, 17 March 2020, <https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/coronavirus-need-adjust-and-reshape-our-
trade-agenda> accessed 10 June 2020. 
42 Mona Pinchis- -19 Symposium: Thinking Creatively and Learning from COVID-19 How 
Opinio Juris, 2 April 2020, 
<https://opiniojuris.org/2020/04/02/covid-19-symposium-thinking-creatively-and-learning-from-covid-19-
how-the-wto-can-maintain-open-trade-on-critical-supplies/> accessed 28 April 2020. 
43 klash and the Ongoing Use of the World Trade Organization 
International Law (forthcoming) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3611539> 
accessed 10 June 2020. 
WTO rules. This means that the many nations that have put such rules in place from 
Colombia to India to the UK will not face multilateral restrictions on their freedom to act. 
 
But is this flexibility really a good thing? As discussed in Section III, export restrictions 
come with many negative side effects, including increases in prices and disruptions in 
production and distribution networks. These effects are problematic for everyone, but 
especially for those countries without the money or industrial capacity to buy or make their 
own substitutes. As with other aspects of the Covid-19 crisis, the impact of export 
restrictions will disproportionately fall on the poor and vulnerable.  
 
states who wish to enact export restrictions, they do not help to ensure equitable global 
access to critical supplies. Indeed, they exacerbate inequality in distribution by failing to 
control the use of export restrictions by countries that seek to protect their own citizens at 
the expense of their neighbours. We may well wish for a global trade regime that pays 
more attention to issues of justice and equity, but that it is not the one we have. 
 
  
